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Introduction
Internet filtering software is hot. Plaintiffs in ACLU v. Reno'
relied heavily on the existence and capabilities of filtering software
(also known as blocking software) in arguing that the Communications
Decency Act was unconstitutional.2 President Clinton has pledged to
"vigorously support" the development and widespread availability of
filtering software Free speech activists see this software as the answer
to the dilemma of indecency regulation, making it possible "to
reconcile free expression of ideas and appropriate protection for
kids."4 Indeed, some of the strongest supporters of such software are
First Amendment activists who sharply oppose direct government
censorship of the net.'
Internet filtering software, further, is here. As of this writing, the
Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) working group has
developed a common language for Internet rating systems, making it
1. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.)(striking down Communications Decency Act),prob. juris.
noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996). The Supreme Court heard oral argument in ACLU v. Reno on
March 19, 1997. See Kenneth Jost, Breyer at Pivot on Internet Decency: Supreme Court Debates
Strictures on Sexually Explicit Sites in Cyberspace, RECORDER, Mar. 20, 1997, at 1, 2.
2. See Plaintiffs' Post-Hearing Brief at Parts I.C.1 & I.C.2, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-963) (last modified Dec. 6, 1996)<http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/
Cases/EFF_ACLU_v_DoJ/960429_alapost-hearing.brief>. See also Jost, supra note 1, at 2.
During oral argument before the Supreme Court in the case, Bruce Ennis, Jr., representing the
ACLU, told the Court that a "more effective alternative" to the CDA would be to "rely on
parents to use computer software that blocks access to sexual material." Id. at 2 (quoting Bruce
Ennis, Jr.). Deputy Solicitor General Seth Waxman countered, "There is simply no way that
[blocking software] companies or parents can keep up with what should or should not be
screened out." Id. (quoting Seth Waxman).
3. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President
(June 12, 1996)<http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/EFFACLU-v-DoJ/960612_clinton-cda_
decision.statement>.
4. Peter H. Lewis, Microsoft Backs Ratings System for Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996,
at D5 (quoting Daniel Weitzner, Deputy Director, Center for Democracy and Technology); see
Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic
Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1634-35 (1995).
5. Anti-pornography activists, by contrast, have been decidedly less enthusiastic. Some
express concern that such software leaves "the parent ...responsible to go out and buy the
software, become educated about how to apply it, how to install it, how to use it, and how to then
monitor it to make sure your child or his friends have not gotten around it." Pornography on the
Internet. Straight Talk from the Family Research Council (radio broadcast transcript)(last
modified July 3, 1996)<http://www.townhall.comtownhall/FRC/net/st96gl.html>(statement of
Colby May, Senior Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice). To say that blocking
software obviates the need for government speech restrictions is "saying ...that we are free to
pollute our cultural environment, and parents have to buy the gas masks." Id. (statement of
Kristi Hamrick, moderator).
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much easier to create and market such ratings.6 Two heavily-promoted
ratings systems (SafeSurf and RSACi) allow content providers to rate
their own World Wide Web sites in a sophisticated manner.
Microsoft's World Wide Web browser incorporates a feature called
Content Advisor that will block Web sites in accordance with the rules
of any PICS-compliant ratings system, including SafeSurf and RSACi.7
Stand-alone blocking software-marketed under such trademarks as
SurfWatch, Cyber Patrol, CYBERSitter, KinderGuard, Net Nanny,
and Parental Guidance-is gaining increasing sophistication and
popularity.
It is easy to understand the acclaim for filtering software. This
software can do an impressive job at blocking access to sexually
explicit material that a parent does not wish his or her child to see.
The PICS standard for describing ratings systems is an important
technical achievement, allowing the development and easy use of a
variety of sophisticated ratings schemes.
In the midst of the general enthusiasm, though, it is worth trying
to locate filtering technology's limitations and drawbacks. Blocking
software is a huge step forward in solving the dilemma of sexually
explicit speech on the net, but it does have costs. People whose image
of the net is mediated through blocking software may miss out on
worthwhile speech through deliberate exclusion, through inaccuracies
in labeling inherent to the filtering process, and through the restriction
of unrated sites.
6. See Paul Resnick & James Miller, PICS: Internet Access Controls Without Censorship,
39 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 89 (1996). PICS was developed by the World Wide Web
Consortium, the body responsible for developing common protocols and reference codes for the
evolution of the Web, with the participation of Apple, America Online, AT&T, the Center for
Democracy and Technology, Compuserve, DEC, IBM, MCI, the MIT Laboratory for Computer
Science, Microsoft, Netscape, Prodigy, the Recreational Software Advisory Council, SafeSurf,
SurfWatch, Time Warner Pathfinder, and others.
7. Microsoft calls its World Wide Web browser Internet Explorer; Content Advisor first
appeared in Internet Explorer's version 3.0. Content Advisor makes it easiest to use RSACi
ratings. RSACi is an Internet ratings system established by the Recreational Software Advisory
Council (RSAC), which was created by the Software Publishers Association in 1994 to create a
rating system for computer games. RSAC formed a working party in late 1995, including
representatives from Time Warner Pathfinder, AT&T, PICS and Microsoft, to develop RSACi.
See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
For Content Advisor to use ratings from a PICS-compliant rating service other than RSACi,
the user must copy that service's RAT file into his Windows System folder and then click on
"Add A New Rating service" in the IE Options menu. See Safesurf News (visited Feb. 7,
1997)<http://www.safesurf.com/nletter/summ96.htm>.
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Part I of this Article offers some general background on blocking
software. Part II considers the extent of inaccuracy in rating the net. It
is easy to find anecdotes about sites inappropriately blocked by
filtering software, and complaints that ratings systems are
insufficiently fine-tuned to label particular sites accurately. Part II also
considers whether these bad results reflect limitations inherent in the
nature of ratings systems. Part III addresses the treatment of unrated
sites. Relatively few Internet content sources today carry ratings.
What portion of the Net universe can we expect to carry ratings once
the technology is mature? To the extent that the reach of ratings
systems is less than complete, what implications does that have for net
speech as a whole? Part IV examines the extent to which adult access
to the net is likely to be filtered through blocking software.
I
Background
Internet rating services respond to parents' and governments'
concerns about children's access to sexually explicit material, and
other adult content, available on the net. The services focus greatest
attention on children's access to the World Wide Web (Web). The
Web consists of a vast collection of documents, each residing on a
computer linked to the Internet. These documents may contain text,
pictures, sound, and/or video. Any Web document may contain links
to other Web documents or other Internet resources, so that a user
with a Web browser can jump from one document to another with a
single mouse click. It is easy for users without sophisticated equipment
or expensive Internet connections to create Web pages that are then
accessible to any other user with access to the Web.
Rating services have also paid special attention to Usenet
newsgroups. Usenet newsgroups allow any user to post text, pictures,
sound, or video to one of more than 15,000 different open fora, each
devoted to a different topic. About 200,000 computer networks
worldwide participate in the Usenet news system. A small number of
Usenet newsgroups are devoted to sexually explicit material.
It is fairly easy for software to screen access to Usenet news.
Because each newsgroup has a name describing its particular topic
(such as rec.music.folk, soc.culture.peru, or alt.tv.x-files), software
writers can do a reasonably effective job of blocking access to sexually
explicit material by simply blocking access to those newsgroups (such
[VOL. 19:453HASTINGS COMml/ENT L.J.
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as alt.sex.stories) whose names indicate that they include sexually
explicit material.
Blocking access to sexually explicit material on the Web is much
more difficult. There are millions of individual pages on the Web, and
the number is increasing every day. An astonishingly small fraction of
those pages contain sexually explicit material.8 Every Web page
(indeed, every document accessible over the Internet) has a unique
address, or "URL,"9 and the URLs of some Web pages do contain
clues as to their subject matter. Because nothing in the structure or
syntax of the Web requires Web pages to include labels advertising
their content, though, identifying pages with sexually explicit material
is not an easy task.
First-generation blocking software compiled lists of off-limits
Web pages through two methods. First, the rating services hired raters
to work through individual Web pages by hand, following links to
sexually explicit sites and compiling lists of URLs to be deemed off-
limits to children.' ° Second, they used string-recognition software to
automatically proscribe any Web page that contained a forbidden
word (such as "sex" or "xxx") in its URL n
The PICS specifications contemplate that a ratings system can be
more sophisticated. A rating service may rate a document along
multiple dimensions. Instead of merely rating a document as "adult"
or "child-safe," it might give it separate ratings for violence, sex,
nudity, and adult language. Further, along any given dimension, the
rating service may choose from any number of values. Instead of
8. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1996):
While it is difficult to ascertain with any certainty how many sexually explicit sites are
accessible through the Internet, the president of a manufacturer of software designed
to block access to sites containing sexually explicit material testified in the Philadelphia
litigation that there are approximately 5,000 to 8,000 such sites, with the higher
estimate reflecting the inclusion of multiple pages (each with a unique URL) attached
to a single site. The record also suggests that there are at least thirty-seven million
unique URLs. Accordingly, even if there were twice as many unique pages on the
Internet containing sexually explicit materials as this undisputed testimony suggests,
the percentage of Internet addresses providing sexually explicit content would be well
less than one tenth of one percent of such addresses.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. "URL" is an acronym for "Uniform Resource Locator." See Internet Engineering Task
Force, Uniform Resource Locators [RFC-1738] (Dec. 1994)<http://ds.intemic.net/rfc/rfcl738.
txt>.
10. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 840 (E.D. Pa.)(Cyber Patrol), prob. juris, noted,
117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
11. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 932.
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simply rating a site "block" or "no-block" for violence, a rating service
might assign it a rating of between one and ten for increasing amounts
of violent content. These features are important because they allow
the creation of filtering software that is customizable by parents. A
parent subscribing to such a rating service, for example, might seek to
block only sites rated over 3 for violence and 8 for sex. Finally, the
PICS documents note that ratings need not be assigned by the authors
of filtering software.' They can be assigned by the content creators
themselves or by third parties. One of the consequences of the PICS
specifications is that varying groups-the Christian Coalition, say, or
the Boy Scouts-can seek to establish rating services reflecting their
own values, and these ratings can be implemented by off-the-shelf
blocking software. 13
Most rating services today follow the PICS specifications. Their
particular approaches, however, differ. The Recreational Software
Advisory Council (RSAC) has developed an Internet rating system
called RSACi.14 Participating content providers rate their own sites
along a scale of 0 through 4 on four dimensions: violence, nudity, sex,
and language. RSAC does not itself market blocking software; instead,
it licenses its service to software developers. Safesurf is another system
in which content providers rate their own speech.'5 In that system,
content providers choose from nine values in each of nine categories,
from "profanity" through "gambling."16
Rating services associated with individual manufacturers of
blocking software include Cyber Patrol, Specs for Kids, and
CYBERSitter. Cyber Patrol rates sites along fifteen dimensions, from
12. See Resnick & Miller, supra note 6.
13. See id.
14. The heavy hitters behind RSACi have been RSAC, established in 1994 by the Software
Publishers Association, and such industry players as Microsoft, AT&T, and Time Warner
Pathfinder. See supra note 6. As of April 15, 1996, content providers have been able to rate their
own sites using the RSACi system by completing a questionnaire at the RSAC web site,
<http://www.rsac.org>(visited March 27, 1997).
15. SafeSurf describes itself as an "international no-fee parents' organization formed to
protect children on the Internet and the rights of parents through technology and education."
SafeSurf press release (Apr. 18, 1996)<http://www.safesurf.com/press/pressl2.htm>. It uses the
CyberAngels, an offshoot of Curtis Sliwa's Guardian Angels, to patrol sites whose owners have
rated them as suitable for "All Ages," verifying that the sites do not contain adult content. E-
mail from Wendy Simpson, President, SafeSurf to Declan McCullagh (Apr. 28, 1996)(on file with
author).
16. The categories are: profanity, heterosexual themes, homosexual themes, nudity,
violence, intolerance, glorifying drug use, other adult themes, and gambling. See SafeSurf Rating
System (visited Feb. 7,1997)<http://www.safesurf.com/classify/index.html>.
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"violence/profanity" to "alcohol & tobacco," but assigns only two
values within each of those categories: CyberNOT and CyberYES
7
Specs for Kids rates documents along eleven dimensions, including
"advertising," "alternative lifestyles," "politics," and "religion," and
assigns up to five values (including "no rating") in each of those
categories.18 CYBERSitter, by contrast, maintains a single list of
objectionable sites; it affords users no opportunity to block only
portions of the list. 19
II
Accuracy
Since blocking software first came on the market, individual
content providers have complained about the ratings given to their
sites. Not all of those complaints relate to problems inherent to
filtering software. For example, some programs tend to block entire
directories of Web pages simply because they contain a single "adult"
file. That means that large numbers of innocuous Web pages are
blocked merely because they are located near some other page with
adult content.' Some programs block entire domains, including all of
the sites hosted by particular Internet service providers. 2 This may be
17. See CyberNOT List Criteria (last modified May 9, 1996)<http://www.microsys.com/
cyber/cp-list.htm>.
1& See Specs Glossary (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.newview.com/cust/sssg-lvl3a-cL
fcs.html>.
19. See CYBERSitter Product Information (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://solidoak.com/
cysitter.htm>. CYBERSitter characterizes its customers as "strong family-oriented people with
traditional family values." The product is sold by Focus on the Family. See Brock N. Meeks &
Declan B. McCullagh, Jacking In from the 'Keys to the Kingdom' Port, CYBERWIRE DISPATCH
(July 3, 1996)<http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/Decan-McCullagh/cwd.keys.to.the.kingdom.
0796.article>.
20. For the most part, Cyber Patrol drops all but the first three characters of the filename in
the URL, thus blocking innocuous pages. See Meeks & McCullagh, supra note 19. In some
instances, Cyber Patrol blocks at a higher level, so that, for example, it excluded all of
Jewish.com because personal ads were not stored in a separate subdirectory. Eric Berlin &
Andrew Kantor, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, INTERNET WORLD (Oct.
1996)<http://www.iw.com/1996/ll/surf.html>.
21. According to an article in the electronic version of Internet World, CYBERSitter blocks
all sites hosted by cris.com. A CYBERSitter representative suggests that Internet service
providers "are responsible for their content," and that the owners of cris.com are to blame
because they "will not monitor their [customers'] sites." Berlin & Kantor, supra note 20.
According to another recent report, CYBERSitter now blocks all sites at a variety of Internet
service providers including the WELL, the pioneering California electronic community. See K.K.
Campbell, Who's Watching the 'Watchers'?, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 30, 1997, at J3. Cyber Patrol
blocks all pages hosted by crl.com (including a real estate agency's Web pages). A Cyber Patrol
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a temporary glitch, though; over time, it is possible that the most
successful rating services will-properly-label each document
separately."
Other problems arise from the wacky antics of string-recognition
software. America Online's software, ever alert for four-letter words
embedded in text, refused to let users register from the British town of
"Scunthorpe." 3 The University of Kansas Medical Center installed
Surfwatch in its Internet kiosk, and discovered that users could not see
the Web page of their own Archie R. Dykes Medical Libary? For
sheer wackiness, nothing can match a CYBERSitter feature that
causes Web browers to white out selected words but display the rest of
the page (so that the sentence "President Clinton opposes homosexual
marriage" would be rendered "President Clinton opposes
marriage")2 These problems too, though, may be addressed through
proper software design.
Controversies over sites actually rated by humans are less
amenable to technological solution. One dispute arose when Cyber
Patrol blocked animal-rights web pages because of images of animal
abuse, including syphillis-infected monkeys; Cyber Patrol classed
those as "gross depiction" CyberNOTs. 6 The situation was aggravated
because Cyber Patrol, following the entire-directory approach
representative says that the company is reviewing its policy of blocking entire domains. Berlin &
Kantor, supra note 20.
22. The RSACi and Safesurf systems allow content providers to label each page
individually. At a recent PICS developers' workshop, the prevailing view was that filtering
software should expect to find PICS-compliant labels only in the individual documents, not in the
directories or elsewhere in the site. See PICS Developers' Workshop Summary (visited Feb. 7,
1997)<http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS/picsdev-wkshpl.html>. This makes sense only in the
context of software that makes the blocking decision for each page individually.
The more difficult question is whether the problem will persist in connection with third-
party rating services. At least one third-party rating service (Specs for Kids) does rate on the
document level, and such a service should be more attractive to many users; the question is
whether the increased sales will outweigh the added expense of that granularity.
23. The on-line service solved the problem, to its own satisfaction, by advising its customers
from that city to pretend they were from "Sconthorpe" instead. See Clive Feather, AOL Censors
British Town's Namel, 18 RISKS DIGEST, Issue 7 (Apr. 25, 1996)<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/
Risks/18.07.html#subj3.1>. On string-recognition software, see infra notes 64 and 78 and
accompanying text.
24. See Internet Censorship and Blocking Software, WEB4LIB ARCHIVE (visited Mar. 18,
1997)<http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/Web4Lib/archive/9703/0120.html>.
25. See e-mail from Solid Oak Software Technical Support to Bob Stock (Oct. 24, 1996)(on
file with author).
26. See Meeks & McCullagh, supra note 19; Cyber Patrol Censors Animal Rights Web Sites
(visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.mit.edu/activities/safe/labeling/cp-bans-animal-rights>.
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described above, blocked all of the hundred or so animal welfare,
animal rights, and vegetarian pages hosted at the Animal Rights
Resource Site.' An officer of Envirolink, which had provided the web
space, responded: "Animal rights is usually the first step that children
take in being involved in the environment. Ignoring companies like
Mary Kay that do these things to animals and allowing them to
promote themselves like good corporate citizens is a 'gross
depiction. '"'"
Sites discussing gay and lesbian issues are commonly blocked,
even if they contain no references to sex. Surfwatch, in its initial
distribution, blocked a variety of sites including the Queer Resources
Directory, an archive of material on homosexuality in America,29 and
the International Association of Gay Square Dance Clubs. Surfwatch
responded to protests by unblocking most of the contested sites.3°
Other blocking programs, on the other hand, still exclude them: Cyber
Patrol blocks a mirror of the Queer Resources Directory, along with
Usenet newsgroups including clari.news.gays (which carries AP and
Reuters dispatches) and alt.journalism.gay-press. 31 CYBERSitter is
perhaps the most likely to block any reference to sexual orientation,
forbidding such newsgroups as alt.politics.homosexual. In the words of
a CYBERSitter representative: "I wouldn't even care to debate the
issues if gay and lesbian issues are suitable for teenagers . . . . We
filter anything that has to do with sex. Sexual orientation [is about sex]
by virtue of the fact that it has sex in the name. '
The list of blocked sites is sometimes both surprising and
alarming. Cyber Patrol blocks Usenet newsgroups including
alt.feminism, soc.feminism, clari.news.women, soc.support.pregnancy.
loss, and alt.support.fat-acceptance. 33 It blocks gun and Second
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Queer Resources Directory (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://www.qrd.org>. The Health/
AIDS directory at QRD, for example, contains information from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, the AIDS Book Review Journal, and AIDS Treatment News. See
Meeks & McCullagh, supra note 19.
30. See Surfwatch Censorship Against Lesbigay WWW Pages (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://
www.utopia.conmailings/censorship/SurfWatch.Censorship.Against.Lesbigay.www.Pages.html
>; e-mail from Chris Kryzan for wide distribution (June 15, 1995)(on file with author).
31. See Meeks & McCullagh, supra note 19.
32. Id.
33. Id. Indeed, Cyber Patrol apparently blocks all of the alt.support groups (including, for
example, alt.support.shyness and alt.support.depression), along with such groups as
alt.war.vietnam and alt.fan.frank-zappa. E-mail from Declan McCullagh to the fight-censorship
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Amendment Web pages (including one belonging to the NRA
Members' Council- of Silicon Valley). It blocks the Web site of the
League for Programming Freedom (a group opposing software
patents). It blocked the Electronic Frontier Foundation's censorship
archive. 4 It-blocked a site maintained by the U.S. Naval Academy
Weapon Systems Engineering Department.O CYBERSitter blocks the
National Organization of Women web site.' It blocks the Penal
Lexicon, an encyclopedic British site concerned with prisons and penal
affairs.3 It blocks some Web pages that criticize its blocking
decisions,38 and at one point demanded that a critic's Internet service
provider terminate the critic's account or see all of the sites on its
server blocked.39 After the Netly News-a component of Time Warner
Pathfinder-posted a search engine allowing viewers to find out
whether the software blocked particular sites, CYBERSitter blocked
the more than 150,000 pages on pathfinder.com °
One might think that a better answer lies in rating systems, such
as RSACi and SafeSurf, in which content providers evaluate their own
sites. An author, one might assume, could hardly disagree with a rating
he chose himself. The matter, though, is not so clear. When an author
evaluates his site in order to gain a rating from any PICS-compliant
rating service, he must follow the algorithms and rules of that service.
Jonathan Wallace, thus, in an article called Why I Will Not Rate My
mailing list (Oct. 4, 1996)(on file with author); CyberPatrol: The Truth (visited Feb. 7,
1997)<http://www.canucksoup.net/CYBERWHY.HTM>.
34. Meeks & McCullagh, supra note 19. Among the other WWW sites blocked by Cyber
Patrol is that of the Campaign for Real Ale, a British consumer group dedicated to preserving
and promoting traditional pubs and independent breweries. Cyber Patrol lists it as an alcohol &
tobacco CyberNOT. Charles Arthur, Real Ale is Too Strong for the American Moralists,
INDEPENDENT (London), July 22, 1996, at 11.
35. See e-mail from Ad Herzog to the fight-censorship mailing list, Feb. 27, 1997 (on file
with author).
36. Meeks & McCullagh, supra note 19. It also refuses any site whose URL contains
"sinnfein" or "facism." Berlin & Kantor, supra note 20.
37. See The Penal Lexicon: What's New Page (visited Mar. 18, 1997)<http://www.penlex.
org.uk/wnarc5l.html>.
38. See Campbell, supra note 21; Pamela Mendels, Publishers Say CYBERSitter Filter is
Screening Out Their Criticism (Feb. 9, 1997)<http://www.nytimes.com/web/docsroot/library/
cyber/week/020997cybersitter.html>.
39. See David Pescovitz, Site-Filtering Controversy Likely to Heat Up, L.A. TIMFs, Jan. 6,
1997, at D3.
40, See Censorware Search Engine (visited Mar. 18, 1997)<http://www.pathfinder.com/
netly/spoofcentral/censored>.
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Site, asks how he is to rate "An Auschwitz Alphabet,"'4 his powerful
and deeply chilling work of reportage on the Holocaust.' The work
contains descriptions of violence done to camp inmates' sexual organs.
A self-rating system, Wallace fears, would likely force him to choose
between the unsatisfactory alternatives of labeling the work as suitable
for all ages, on the one hand, or "lump[ing it] together with the Hot
Nude Women page" on the other.
43
At least some of the rating services' problems in assigning ratings
to individual documents are inherent. It is the nature of the process
that no ratings system can classify documents in a perfectly satisfactory
manner. Consider first how a ratings system designer might construct a
ratings algorithm. She might provide an algorithm made up entirely of
simple, focused questions, in which each question has a relatively
easily ascertainable "yes" or "no" answer. (Example: "Does the file
contain a photographic image depicting exposed male or female
genitalia?") Alternatively, she might seek to afford evaluators more
freedom to apply broad, informal, situationally sensitive guidelines so
as to capture the overall feel of each site. (Example: "Is the site
suitable for a child below the age of 13?")'
In jurisprudential terms, the first approach relies on "rules" and
the second on "standards." 45 The RSACi system attempts to be rule-
based. In coding its violence levels, for example, to include "harmless
conflict; some damage to objects"; "creatures injured or killed;
damage to objects, fighting"; "humans injured or killed with small
amount of blood"; "humans injured or killed; blood and gore"; and
"wanton and gratuitous violence; torture; rape," its designers have
striven to devise simple, hard-edged rules, with results turning
41. Jonathan Wallace, An Auschwitz Alphabet (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.spectacle.
org/695/ausch.html>.
42. Jonathan Wallace, Why I Will Not Rate My Site (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http:/www.
spectacle.org/cda/rate.html#report>.
43. Id.
44. Or she could take an approach falling somewhere in between. The polar models I
describe in the text, though, provide a useful way of looking at the problem.
45. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1685, 1688-89 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379-
80 (1985); Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Forward: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech,
81 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1167-69 (1993); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 953, 956 (1995) (adopting somewhat different terminology, but contrasting "two stylized
conceptions of legal judgment": "clear, abstract rules laid down in advance of actual
applications" and "law-making at the point of application through case-by-case decisions,
narrowly tailored to the particulars of individual circumstances").
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mechanically on a limited number of facts. I Not all RSAC categories
are hard-edged-the "revealing attire" nudity level requires a rater to
decide whether a "reasonable person" would consider particular
clothing sexually suggestive and alluring47-- but the system overall
aims for rules.
Other rating systems rely more heavily on standards. The
SafeSurf questionnaire, for example, requires the self-rater to
determine whether nudity is "artistic" (levels 4 through 6), "erotic"
(level 7), "pornographic" (level 8), or "explicit and crude"
pornographic (level 9). The Voluntary Content Rating self-rating
system promoted by CYBERSitter is almost the model of a standards-
based regime: it offers as its only guidance the instructions that self-
raters should determine whether their sites are "not suitable for
children under the age of 13," and whether they include material
"intended for an audience 18 years of age or older."49 Specs for Kids
raters are instructed to distinguish between sites that: (1) refer to
homosexuality "[i]mpartial[ly]"; (2) discuss it with "acceptance or
approval"; or (3) "[a]ctive[ly] promot[e]" it or "attempt[] to recruit the
viewer."'' 0 Each of these classifications requires more judgment on the
part of the evaluator, and is not so hard-edged as the RSACi
categories. Individuals with different perspectives and values may
disagree as to where the lines fall.5' With respect to the Specs
treatment of references to homosexuality, individuals disagree as to
whether the categories are even coherent 2 These categories work
46. See Jim Miller et al., Rating Services and Rating Systems (and their Machine Readable
Descriptions) (last modified Oct. 31, 1996)<http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS/services.html>,
at Appendix B. There is a slightly different description of the RSACi categories at Rating the
Web <http://www.rsac.org/why.html>.
47. See The Net Labeling Delusion: Protection or Oppression (visited Jan. 14,
1997)<http://www.thehub.com.au/-rene/liberty/labe3.html>.
48. See SafeSurf Rating System (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.safesurf.com/classify/
index.html>.
49. See Solid Oak Software, Inc. VCR Rating System (visiied Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.
solidoak.com/vcr.htm>.
50. Specs Glossary (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.newview.com/cust/ss-sg-lvl3acf__
fcs.html>.
51. It is inevitable that folks will disagree as to the consequences of an item of speech being
pigeonholed in a particular category-whether, for example, youngsters should be exposed to
scenes of murder and mayhem. My point about the examples in the text is that individuals will
come to different conclusions regarding which pigeonhole a given item of speech should be
deemed to occupy in the first place.
52. Elsewhere in the Specs rating system, one can find definitions that seem standard-like
because it is doubtful that they mean what they say. For example, the Specs default settings do
not allow persons under 18 to view Web sites that "[a]ttempt[] to persuade the viewer to join a
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only within a community of shared values, so that evaluators can draw
on the same norms and assumptions in applying the value judgments
embedded in the standards.
This distinction follows the more general rules-standards
dichotomy in law, which focuses on the instructions lawmakers give to
law-appliers in a variety of contexts.-' Legal thought teaches that rules
and standards each have disadvantages. A problem with standards is
that they are less constraining; relatively speaking, a standards-based
system will lack consistency and predictability.- Rules become
increasingly necessary as the universe of law-appliers becomes larger,
less able to rely on shared culture and values as a guide to applying
standards in a relatively consistent and coherent way.5 One can see a
parallel in problems the Yahoo! indexing service faces in seeking to
classify the increasing number of Web sites. Yahoo!s taxonomy
embodies editorial judgments; the job is not amenable to resolution
simply through rules. Consistent application of the taxonomy "comes
from having the same 20 people classify every site, and by having
those people crammed together in the same building where they are
constantly engaged in a discussion of what belongs where."'  As a
result,
specific political group." Specs Glossary (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.newview.com/cust/
sssg..lvl3a_cf_fcs.html>. If this is not to exclude the Democratic and Republican parties (say),
the test must embody some unarticulated assumptions about which political appeals are the
pernicious ones-rendering the de facto category standard-like and unconstrained.
53. See sources cited supra note 45.
54. See Kennedy, supra note 45, at 1688-89; Sullivan, supra note 45, at 62-63; Sunstein,
supra note 45, at 972-77.
55. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 512 n.8 (1988)[hereinafter
Schauer, Formalism]:
[Consider] the transformation of the 'honor codes' at various venerable universities.
These codes were phrased in quite general terms at their inception in the 18th and 19th
centuries because these schools contained homogenous student bodies who shared a
common conception of the type of conduct definitionally incorporated within the word
"honor." If a person thought that purchasing a term paper from a professional term
paper service was consistent with being honorable, then that person simply did not
know what "honor" meant. As values have changed and as student bodies have become
less homogenous, however, shared definitions of terms such as "honor" have broken
down. Some people now do think that buying a term paper can be honorable, and this
breakdown in shared meaning has caused general references to "honor" to be displaced
in such codes by more detailed rules. There may now be little shared agreement about
what the precept "be honorable" means, but there is considerable agreement about
what the rule "do not purchase a term paper" requires.
See also id. at 539-41
56. Steve G. Steinberg, Seek and Ye Shall Find (Maybe), WIRED, May 1996, at 108,112-13.
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Yahoo! is faced with an unforgiving trade-off between the size and
the quality of its directory. If Yahoo! hires another 50 or 60
classifiers to examine every last site on the Web, the catalog will
become less consistent. . . . On the other hand, if Yahoo! stays
with a small number of classifiers, the percentage of sites Yahoo!
knows about will continue to shrink.57
For this reason, the designers of RSACi attempted to be rule-like.
They contemplate that the universe of ratings evaluators will include
every content provider on the Web; that group can claim no shared
values and culture. To accomodate that heterogeneous group, RSAC
offers a rules-based questionnaire that (it hopes) all can understand in
a similar manner. This, RSAC explains, will "provide[] fair and
consistent ratings by eliminating most of the subjectivity inherent in
alternative rating systems. "58 It seems plain that with a relatively large
universe of evaluators-and it is hard to see how one could seek to
map the entire Net without one-a ratings system relying too heavily
on standards just won't work. The dangers of arbitrariness and
inconsistency will be too great.59
Rules, though, have their own problems. They direct law-appliers
to treat complex and multifaceted reality according to an
oversimplified schematic.60 The point of rules, after all, is that by
simplifying an otherwise complex inquiry, they "screen[] off from a
decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise
take into account."61 They may thus generate results ill-serving the
policies behind the rules.62 Consider the task of deciding which citizens
are mature enough to vote. A rule that any person can vote if he or
she has reached the age of 18 has the advantage of administrability
57. Id. at 113; see also Leslie Walker, On the Web, a Catalogue of Complexity, WASH. POST,
Nov. 20, 1996, at F17; The Total Librarian, ECONOMIST (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.
economist.com/review/rev9/rvl2/review.html>.
58. RSAC Specifics About the Rating Process, Questionnaire, the PICS Standard and
Granularity (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.rsac.org/start.html>.
59. Indeed, for just that reason, First Amendment philosophy largely proscribes standards
on the level of operative First Amendment doctrine. Speech-regulatory law, the Supreme Court
has explained, must be expressed in hard-edged, nondiscretionary terms so as to minimize the
possibility of government arbitrariness or bias. Situationally sensitive judgment by government
officials, making speech-regulatory decisions turn on "the exercise of judgment and the
formation of an opinion," is forbidden. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395,
2401-02 (1992) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)); see Weinberg, supra
note 45, at 1169-70; see also Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 14-17 (1989).
60. See Kennedy, supra note 45, at 1689.
61. Schauer, Formalism, supra note 55, at 510.
62. See id. at 534-37; Sunstein, supra note 45, at 992-93.
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and avoids biased enforcement. Few of us would welcome a system in
which a government bureaucrat examined each of us individually to
determine whether we were mature enough to vote. Because the rule
is much simpler than the reality it seeks to govern, though, it is both
over-and under-inclusive: it bars from the franchise some people
under 18 who are mature, and grants the franchise to some people
over 18 who are not. Rules thus give rise to their own arbitrariness.
63
At best, a rule-based filtering system will miss nuances; at worst, it will
generate absurd results-as when America Online, enforcing a rule
forbidding certain words in personal member profiles, barred
subscribers from identifying themselves as "breast" cancer survivors. 4
Given this theoretical critique, one might think that the challenge
facing ratings system designers is to devise really good rules-based
systems, ones that track reality as well as possible, minimizing the
difficulties noted above. That is what RSAC claims to have done in
RSACi.65 I think the product of any such effort, though, necessarily
will be flawed. The next few pages attempt to explain why.
Let's return to the choices facing a ratings system designer as she
constructs blocking software. So far, this Article has not addressed the
most basic question confronting her: what sort of material should
trigger ratings consequences? Should children have access to material
about weapons making?' How about hate speech? 67 Or artistic
63. See Kennedy, supra note 45, at 1689; Sullivan, supra note 45, at 62; Sunstein, supra note
45 at 994; Weinberg, supra note 45, at 1168-69.
64. See Richard A. Knox, Women Go On Line to Decry Ban on 'Breast,' BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 1, 1995, at A12. This incident was likely the result of string-identification software. String-
identification programs are excellent examples of rules-based filtering systems.
65. In fact, RSACi is seriously flawed for reasons having nothing to do with rules and
standards. The original RSAC rating system was designed for video games. RSACi carries over
the categories and language of the earlier video-game rating system even where they are
completely inappropriate. Thus, for example, RSACi's definition of "aggressive violence" on a
web page excludes acts of nature "such as flood, earthquake, tornado, hurricane, etc., unless the
act is CAUSED by Sentient Beings or Non-sentient Objects in the game or where the game
includes a character playing the role of 'God' or 'nature' and the character caused the act." See
RSACi Ratings Dissected (visited Mar. 18, 1997) <http://www.antipope.demon.co.uk/charlie/
nonfiction/rant/rsaci.html>. One consequence of RSAC's approach is that the Internet rating
system nowhere acknowledges a distinction between images and text.
66. In the wake of recent political speculation about bomb-making recipes on the Internet,
five major rating services agreed to work together to "ensure that parents can block Internet sites
containing weapons and bomb making information and recipes." Press Release, SafeSurf Enables
Parents to Block Internet Bomb Sites (Aug. 1, 1996)<http://www.safesurf.com/press/pressl6.htm>.
67. The Specs default settings, for example, would deny to persons under 18 any
"[m]aterial defaming one or more social groups or members of such groups." See Specs
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depictions of nudity.? Again, she can take two different approaches.
First, she can decide all such questions herself, so that the home user
need only turn the system on and all choices as to what is blocked are
already made. CYBERSitter adopts this approach.69 This has the
benefit of simplicity, but seems appropriate only if members of the
target audience are in basic agreement with the rating service (and
each other) respecting what sort of speech should and should not be
blocked.'
Alternatively, she can leave those questions for the user to
answer. The ratings system designer need not decide whether to block
Web sites featuring bomb-making recipes or hate speech. She can
instead design the system so that the user has the power to block those
sites if he chooses. Microsoft's implementation of the RSACi labels
allows parents to select the levels of adult language, nudity, sex and
violence that the browser will let through.71 Cyber Patrol allows
parents to select which of the twelve CyberNOT categories to block.
Either approach, though, imposes restrictions on the categories
chosen by the ratings system designer. If the system designer wishes- to
leave substantive choices to parents, she must create categories that
correspond to the different sides of the relevant substantive questions.
That is, if the designer wishes to leave users the choice whether to
block sites featuring hate speech, she must break out sites featuring
hate speech into a separate category or categories. If she wishes to
leave the user the choice whether to block sites that depict explicit
sexual behavior but nonetheless have artistic value, she must
categorize those sites differently from those that do not have artistic
value.' On the other hand, if the system designer makes those
Glossary (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://www.newview.com/cust/ss-sg-lvl3acfLfcs.html>; Specs:
Age Defaults (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://www.newview.com/cust/ssstsp-lvl2_cs.html>.
68. Specs classes all nudity as either "in an artistic or educational context," or "with the
principal purpose of exciting the viewer." Specs Glossary, supra note 67.
69. See supra text accompanying note 20.
70. To the extent that a user does not agree, the service will block sites he would want
admitted, or let through sites he would want shut out, or both.
71. See Using Content Advisor (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://microsoft.com/ie/mostlhowto/
ratings.htm>.
72. As a ratings system multiplies parental choice, it becomes more complex, and, perhaps,
harder to use. As a practical matter, rating system designers will have to balance fine
differentiation of the ratings system against ease of use. See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-
Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1172 (1996). Cf. Solid
Oak Software's Voluntary Web Site Rating System (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://www.
solidoak.com/vcr.htm>(arguing self-rating system should be "extremely simple," in contrast to
"PICS compliant ratings systems where there are several dozen possible ratings").
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substantive decisions herself, making her own value choices as to what
material should and should not be blocked, she must create categories
that correspond to those value choices.
The problem is that many of these questions cleave on lines
defined by standards. Many users, for example, might like to block
"pornography," but allow other, more worthy, speech, even if it is
sexually explicit. SafeSurf responds to that desire when it requires self-
raters to determine whether nudity is "artistic," "erotic,"
"pornographic," or "explicit and crude" pornographic. It gets high
marks for attempting to conform its system to user intuitions, but its
lack of rulishness means problems in application. 3 Similarly, Specs'
distinction between "impartial reference," "acceptance or approval,"
and "active promotion" of homosexuality may well correspond to the
intuitions of much of its target audience but will hardly be
straightforward in actual application. The problem increases with the
heterogeneity of the service's audience: the more heterogeneous the
audience, the more categories a rating system must include to
accomodate different user preferences.
With this perspective, one can better appreciate the limitations of
RSAC's attempt to be rule-bound. RSACi ignores much content that
some other ratings systems classify as potentially unsuitable, including
speech relating to drug use, alcohol, tobacco, gambling, scatology,
computer hacking and software piracy, devil worship, religious cults,
militant or extremist groups, weapon making, tatooing and body
piercing, and speech "grossly deficient in civility or behavior."'74 For
many observers (myself included), RSACi's narrow scope is good
news because it limits the ability to block access to controversial
political speech. My point, though, is that RSACi had to confine its
reach if it was to maintain its rule-bounded nature.
73. The Federal Communications Commission relies on an emphatically standard-like
guide to determine whether speech broadcast on television and radio is "indecent." The resulting
uncertainties have subjected the agency to critical attack. See generally Jonathan Weinberg,
Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. 221 (1996). The FCC, though, is a single
entity; its choices will display far more consistency than those of millions of disconnected content
providers each evaluating their own sites.
74. All of these areas of speech trigger Cyber Patrol blocking (except for "tatooing and
body piercing," which constitute a CyberNOT only to the extent they result in "gross
depictions"). See CyberPatrol CyberNOT List Criteria (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://www.
microsys.com/cyber/cp-list.htm>. Tatooing and body piercing are specifically blocked by Specs
(in a category, called "subjects of maturity," that lumps them in with "illegal drugs, weapon
making ...[and] some diseases." Specs Glossary, supra note 67. Cf. Balkin, supra note 72, at




The problem appears as well in connection with the categories
RSACi does address. Consider RSACi's treatment of sex. It divides up
sexual depictions into "romance, no sex," "passionate kissing,"
"clothed sexual touching," "non-explicit sexual activity," and "explicit
sexual activity; sex crimes."7 5 But RSACi, in contrast to some other
ratings systems, does not seek to distinguish educational, artistic, or
crude depictions from others. There is no way, consistent with
rulishness, that it can seek to distinguish the serious or artistic from
the titilating. It achieves rule-boundedness, and ease of administration,
at the expense of nuance; it achieves consistent labelling but in
categories that do not correspond to the ones many people want.
In sum, rating system designers face a dilemma. If a rating service
seeks to map the Web in a relatively comprehensive manner, it must
rely on a relatively large group of evaluators. Such a group of
evaluators can achieve fairness and consistency only if the ratings
system uses simple, hard-edged categories relying on a few, easily
ascertainable characteristics of each site. Such categories, though, will
not categorize the Net along the lines that home users will find most
useful, and will not empower those users to heed their own values
in deciding what speech should and should not be blocked. To the
extent that ratings system designers allow evaluators to consider more
factors in a more situationally specific manner to capture the essence
of each site, they will ensure inconsistency and hidden value choices as
the system is applied.
III
Unrated Sites
Blocking software can work perfectly only if all sites are rated.
Otherwise, the software must either exclude all unrated sites, barring
innocuous speech, or allow unrated sites, letting in speech that the
user would prefer to exclude. 76 What are the prospects that a rating
service will be able to label even a large percentage of the millions of
pages on the Web? What are the consequences if it cannot?
First, consider rating services associated with individual
manufacturers of blocking software, such as CYBERSitter and Cyber
Patrol. These services hire raters to label the entire Web, site by site.
The limits on their ability to do so are obvious. As the services get
75. RSAC Rating the Web (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://www.rsac.org/why.html>.
76. If unrated sites are either all innocuous or all verboten, we have an exceptional case;
blocking software can then treat all according to a single rule.
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bigger, hiring more and more employees to rate sites, their consistency
will degrade; that was one of the lessons of Part II of this Article.
Moreover, no service could be big enough to rate the entire Web. Too
many new pages come on-line every day. The content associated with
any given page is constantly changing 7 Further, some of the sites
most likely to be ephemeral are also among the most likely to carry
sexually explicit material. A ratings service simply cannot keep tabs on
every college freshman who gets to school and puts up a Web page,
notwithstanding that college freshmen are of an age to be more
interested in dirty pictures than most. A ratings service certainly
cannot keep tabs on every Web page put up by a college freshman in
Osaka, say, or in Amsterdam. So any such rating service must take for
granted that there will be a huge number of unrated sites.
As a practical matter, providing access to all unrated sites is not
an option for these rating services; it would let through too much for
them to be able to market themselves as reliable screeners. Instead,
they must offer users other options, dealing with unrated sites in one
of two ways. First, they can seek to catch questionable content through
string-recognition software. CYBERSitter, for example, offers this
option. The problem with this approach, though, is that at least under
current technology, string-recognition software simply doesn't work
very well. This article has already mentioned America Online's
travails with the town of Scunthorpe and the word "breast";78 other
examples are easy to find. Surfwatch, for example, blocked a page on
the White House web site because its URL contains the forbidden
word "couples" (http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/kids/html/couples.
html). 9 The second option is for the rating services simply to block all
unrated sites. Industry members seem to contemplate this as the
necessary solution. Microsoft, for example, cautions Internet content
providers that "[f]or a rating system to be useful, the browser
77. Rating services are only beginning to confront the issue of updating ratings for
particular sites as their contents change. RSACi provides one-year expiration dates for its labels.
SafeSurf is providing no expiration dates, instead simply enjoining content providers to update
their ratings if there is a material change in the content of their speech. See PICS Developers'
Workshop Summary, supra note 22.
78. See supra notes 23 and 64 and accompanying text.
79. See Douglas Bailey, Couplegate, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 22, 1996, at 54. The page displays
pictures of Bill and Hillary Clinton and Al and Tipper Gore.
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application must deny access to sites that are unrated." Other
observers reach the same result.81
What about self-rating approaches, like those of SafeSurf and
RSACi? These services have the potential for near-universal reach,
since they can draw on the services of an effectively unlimited number
of evaluators. While the evaluators will be a diverse group (to say the
least), rating service designers can try to cope with that diversity by
constructing rule-bound questionnaires. While some evaluators may
misrepresent their sites, rating services can try to devise enforcement
mechanisms to cope with that as well. On the other hand, self-rating
services will not achieve their potential unless content providers have
a sufficient incentive to participate in the ratings process in the first
place. 2
That incentive is highly uneven. Mass-market commercial
providers seeking to maximixe their audience reach will participate in
any significant self-rating system, so as not to be shut out of homes in
which parents have configured their browsers to reject all unrated
sites. 3 Many noncommercial site owners, though, may not participate.
They may be indifferent to their under-18 visitors and may not wish to
incur the costs of self-rating. It is still early to predict what those costs
may be. For the owner of a large site containing many documents,
supplying a rating for each page may be a time-consuming pain in the
neck.8'
80. The PICS Standard (visited Feb. 7, 1997)<http://www.microsoft.comlintdev/sdk/docst
ratings/ratng002.htm>.
81. See Whit Andrews, Site-Rating System Slow to Catch On, WEB WEEK (July 8, 1996)
<http://www.webweek.com/96July8/comm/rating.html>(quoting Compuserve represent -ative Jeff
Shafer); Specs FAQs: Quick Quest General Info (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://www.newview.
com/cust/ss.qq-lvl3a-reg.html>(recommending users select option of blocking all unrated sites
"to ensure a safe Internet environment"); e-mail from Andy Oram, O'Reilly and Associates, to
telecomreg mailing list (May 21, 1996)(on file with author).
82. Few Web sites today carry self-rating labels. See Andrews, supra note 81 (only two of
the "more than 50" sites listed in the Entertainment Magazine: Sex category at Yahoo! carry self-
ratings); see also Hiawatha Bray, Rated Pfor Preemptive: System to Shield Kids From Adult Web
Material Also Seeks to Keep Censors Off Net, BOSTON GLOBE, Jul. 25, 1996, at E4 ("only a tiny
percentage" of Web sites have RSACi ratings).
83. See Lewis, supra note 4; RSAC Rating the Web (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://www.
rsac.org/why.html>. Cf. Balkin,supra note 72, at 1164 (discussing the V-chip).
84. See Andrews, supra note 81. There are two separate problems here. The less important
one is the technical issue of affixing a rating to each individual page. As noted supra note 22, the
prevailing view at a recent PICS developers' workshop was that filtering software should expect
to find PICS-compliant labels in each document; content providers cannot get away with
supplying "blanket" ratings at the directory level or higher. On the other hand, it should be easy
[VOL. 19:453
RSAC appears to have abandoned plans to charge web sites for
using its ratings, 85 but there may be other disincentives. Some content
providers may not self-rate because they are philosophically opposed
to the censorship a rating system enabless6 or are dissatisfied with the
choices a rating system provides.87 More generally, why should a
college or graduate student with a Web page bother to self-rate? He's
not necessarily writing for people concerned about ratings, and if
those people exclude him, the author may not much care.
It may be that the only way to ensure participation in a self-rating
system even in a single country (let alone internationally) would be for
the government to compel content providers to self-rate (or to compel
Internet access providers to require their customers to do so). It is not
obvious how such a requirement would work. The drafters of such a
law would face the choice of forcing content providers to score their
sites with reference to a particular rating system specified in the law,
or allowing them leeway to choose one of a variety of PICS-compliant
ratings systems. Neither approach seems satisfactory. The first,
mandating use of a particular rating system, would freeze
technological development by eliminating competitive pressures
leading to the introduction and improvement of new searching,
filtering, and organizing techniques. It would leave consumers unable
to choose the rating system that best served their needs. The second
would be little better. Some government organ would have to assume
the task of certifying particular self-rating systems as adequately
singling out material unsuitable for children. It is hard to imagine how
to develop software that will automatically insert labels into Web pages, so long as all of the
pages on a site carry the same rating. See PICS Developers' Workshop Summary, supra note 22.
The more important problem arises when a content provider must audit each page of a large
archive to determine what rating that page should receive. Robert Croneberger, director of the
Carnegie Library in Pittsburgh, testified at the ACLU v. Reno trial that he would have to hire 180
additional staff in order to search the library's on-line materials (in particular, its on-line card
catalog) so as to be able to tag individual potentially indecent items. Trial Transcript for Mar. 22,
1996 at 101-02, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-963)<http://www.eff.
org/pub/Legal/Cases/EFF ACLU_v_DoJ/960322_croneberger.testimony>. It would be a huge
task for MSNBC, say, to rate its news stories individually for descriptions or pictures of
violent behavior-and perhaps for that reason, as of this writing, MSNBC does not provide
RSACi ratings. See Declan McCullagh, RSACi-Hacky, NETLY NEWS (Mar. 18, 1997)<http://cgi.
pathfinder.com/@@ALRDzgcACqLjhGnr/netly/1,1039,740,00.html>.
85. See e-mail from Stephen Balkam, RSACi, to Irene Graham (Feb. 14, 1997)(on file with
author).
86. See 3 Trial Transcript at 192:3-4, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No.
96-963)(testimony of Barry Steinhardt).
87. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
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that agency could ensure that every approved system yielded ratings
useful to most parents, while nonetheless maintaining a healthy
market and allowing innovation.
In any event, a mandatory self-rating requirement would likely be
held unconstitutional. In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,'
the Court considered a requirement that professional fundraisers
disclose to potential donors the percentage of charitable contributions
collected over the previous twelve months that were actually turned
over to charity. The Court explained that "mandating speech that a
speaker would not otherwise make" necessarily alters the content of
the speech and thus amounts to content-based regulation.89 Even
when a compelled statement is purely factual, the compulsion burdens
protected speech and is subject to "exacting" scrutiny, subject to the
rule that government cannot "dictate the content of speech absent
compelling necessity, and then, only by means precisely tailored." '
The Court repeated that analysis in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,91 striking down a requirement that persons distributing
election materials state their names and addresses in those materials.
The Court explained that the requirement was a "direct regulation of
the content of speech" subject to "exacting" scrutiny.92 Even though
the compelled disclosure was useful to voters and uncontroversially
factual, the state was requiring "that a writer make statements or
disclosures she would otherwise omit"; the restriction, accordingly,
could not stand unless narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state
interest.93
A requirement that Internet content providers provide ratings of
their speech falls straightforwardly under the rule of those cases.9'
88. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
89. Id. at 795.
90. Id. at 798,800. The Court noted that "[p]urely commercial speech is more susceptible to
compelled disclosure requirements." Id. at 796 n.9 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2347 (1995). A self-rating requirement, though, would affect
noncommercial as well as commercial speech. The Justices have noted that a state can compel
doctors to make certain disclosures as part of the practice of medicine, see Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.), but that isn't this
case either.
91. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
92. Id. at 1518.
93. Id. at 1519-20.
94. See also Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2347-48:
[O]ne important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses
to speak may also decide what not to say . . . . [Except in the context of commercial
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Even if the characterization of speech according to the taxonomy of a
particular rating system were deemed factual and value-neutral,
requiring a speaker to characterize her speech in that manner would
require her to incorporate into her speech a "statement[] . . . she
would otherwise omit." Such a requirement must surmount exacting
scrutiny.
95
In fact, mandatory self-rating is even more problematic. The
Court has repeatedly recognized the impermissibility of requiring a
speaker to associate herself with particular ideas she disagrees with.96
Requiring self-rating does that, because rating is not factual and value-
neutral. Mandatory self-rating compels the speaker to associate herself
with the values and worldview embodied in the rating taxonomy. The
drafters of RSACi, or SafeSurf, may view-and hence
compartmentalize-the universe of speech in a way I reject. RSACi,
for example, classifies sexually explicit speech without regard to its
educational value or its crass commercialism; that choice is
inconsistent with the values of many. Some taxonomies make the
conflict more obvious than others; it would surely be offensive for
many to be required to characterize their speech using Specs for Kids
criteria, under which a message that expresses "acceptance" of
homosexuality is by definition not "impartial."'  But any taxonomy
incorporates editorial and value judgments.
advertising,] this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies
not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of
fact the speaker would rather avoid . . . . Nor is the rule's benefit restricted to the
press, being enjoyed by business corporations generally and by ordinary people
engaged in unsophisticated expression as well as by professional publishers. Its point is
simply the point of all speech protection, which is to shield just those choices of content
that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987), is not to the contrary. The Court in that case
approved statutory provisions pursuant to which the Justice Department characterized speech
distributed by foreign agents as "political propaganda." The disseminator of the speech, however,
was not required to characterize it in that manner. The case was about the extent to which the
government can perjoratively characterize a person's speech, not about the extent to which
government can force a person to characterize her own speech, perjoratively or otherwise.
96. See Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2347-48; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475
U.S. 1, 15 (1986)(plurality opinion) (holding government may not "require [speakers] to associate
with speech with which [they] may disagree," nor force them to "alter their speech to conform
with an agenda they do not set"); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)(holding
government may not compel citizen to "be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable"); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)(holding government may not prescribe an orthodoxy and "force citizens to
confess [it] by word").
97. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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Moreover, a self-rating requirement may otherwise chill protected
speech. To the extent that rating criteria are less than wholly rule-like,
their vagueness will lead Internet content providers to self-censor.
Content providers will "steer far wider of the unlawful zone"" in
order to avoid sanctions for misrating. "Vagueness and the attendant
evils . . . are not rendered less objectionable because the regulation
of expression is one of classification rather than direct suppression." 99
I am doubtful that a self-rating requirement could survive
exacting scrutiny. Even without a self-rating requirement, parents can
restrict their children's access to sexually explicit sites by using
blocking programs, and instructing the software to block all unrated
sites. Indeed, the wave of the future may well be Web browser add-
ons, marketed by entities such as Disney, that collect a few tens of
thousands of Web sites specifically chosen to be kid-friendly and block
access to all others. A self-rating requirement would be helpful to
parents only in that it would enable them to limit their children's
access in such a way that the kids could also view an uncertain number
of additional sites, not containing sexually explicit material, whose
providers would not otherwise choose to self-rate. In light of the First
Amendment damage done by a compelled self-rating requirement,
accomplishing that goal does not seem to be a compelling or
overriding state interest.'
The result, though, is that child-configured lenses will show only a
limited, flattened view of the Internet. If many Internet content
providers decline to self-rate, the only "safe" response may be to
configure blocking software to exclude unrated sites."0 ' The plausible
result? A typical home user, running Microsoft Internet Explorer set
to filter using RSACi tags will have a browser configured to accept
duly rated mass-market speech from large entertainment corporations,
but to block out a substantial amount of quirky, vibrant individual
98. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958)).
99. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 688 (1968); see also Motion
Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Specter, 315 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
100. The Court followed a similar reasoning process in McIntyre. The state in that case
supported its ban on anonymous election materials by pointing to its interest in policing
fraudulent statements and libel in election campaigns. The Court noted, though, that other
provisions of state election law barred the making or dissemination of false statements. The value
of the challenged provision was merely incremental. That incremental benefit could not justify
the damage the provision did to free speech. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct.
1511, 1520-22 (1995).
101. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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speech from unrated (but child-suitable) sites. This prospect is
disturbing.
The Internet is justly celebrated as "the most participatory form
of mass speech yet developed." 1 2 A person or organization with an
Internet hookup can easily disseminate speech across the entire
medium at low cost; the resulting "worldwide conversation"' 1 features
an immense number of speakers and "astoundingly diverse
content."'" As Judge Dalzell noted in ACLU v. Reno, the Internet
vindicates the First Amendment's protection of "the 'individual
dignity and choice' that arises from 'putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us,"' because
"every minute [Internet communication] allows individual citizens
actually to make those decisions."1' But this prospect is threatened if
widespread adoption of blocking software ends up removing much of
the speech of ordinary citizens, leaving the viewer little to surf but
mass-market commercial programming. One hardly needs the Internet
for that; we get it already from the conventional media.
In sum, blocking software could end up blocking access to a
significant amount of the individual, idiosyncratic speech that makes
the Internet a unique medium of mass communication. Filtering
software, touted as a speech-protective technology, may instead
contribute to the flattening of speech on the Internet.
IV
Children, Adults, and Blocking Software
You may protest that I am making much of little here. After all,
blocking software is intended to restrict children's access to
questionable sites. It won't affect what adults can see on the
Internet-or will it? It seems to me that, in important respects, it will.
The desire to restrict children's access has spurred the recent
development of filtering technology. Widespread adoption of that
software, though, will not likely leave adults unaffected.
In a variety of contexts, we can expect to see adults reaching the
Internet through approaches monitored by blocking software. In the
home, parents may set up filters at levels appropriate for their
102. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa.)(Dalzell, J.),prob. juris. noted, 117 S.
Ct. 554 (1996).
103. Id. at 883.
104. Id. at 877.
105. Id. at 881-82 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991)).
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children, and not disable them for their own use.' 6 They may
subscribe to an Internet access provider that filters out material at the
server level, so that nobody in the household can see "objectionable"
sites except by establishing an Internet access account with a new
provider.'W If, as seems likely, future versions of the PICS
specifications support the transmission of filtering criteria to search
engines, then users running Internet searches will not even know
which sites otherwise meeting their criteria were censored by the
blocking software."~
Other people get their Internet connections through libraries;
indeed, some policymakers tout libraries and other community
institutions as the most promising vehicle for ensuring universal access
to the Internet.1 ' 9 The American Library Association takes the
position that libraries should provide unrestricted access to
information resources; it characterizes theuse of blocking programs as
106. This concern is most salient in connection with blocking programs, such as Microsoft's
Content Advisor, that block any access to restricted sites through the computer on which the
program is installed unless the program is disabled. Other programs, including Cyber Patrol,
offer a more advanced feature known as "multiple user profiles." Each family member can have
his or her own password, and the program can be configured at the start to grant the different
password holders different levels of access. These programs make it easy for a parent to
access the sites he seeks to exclude his child from. See PICS Developers' Workshop Summary,
supra note 22 (noting formation of working group to specify formats for describing PICS user
profiles). Parents may be wary of this feature, though, since the exclusion is only as secure as the
parent's (frequently-used) password.
107. See, e.g., BESS.NET The Service (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://demo.bess.net/about_
bess/theservice.html>. Safesurf is now providing technology-the Safesurf Internet Filtering
Solution-that allows any ISP to offer parents this easy option. See Rose Aguilar, Site Filters
Criticized, THE NET (Oct. 18, 1996)<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,4609,00.html>. Even
some households without children, if blocking software comes bundled with their Web browser,
may choose to enable that software because they believe that otherwise they may be confronted
with smut.
108. When a user running blocking software seeks to conduct a search using an Internet
search engine such as Alta Vista, the software will transmit the user's filtering rules to the search
engine. The search engine will tailor its search so as not to return any sites excluded by the filter.
Participants at the recent PICS Developers' Workshop agreed that this was the preferable
approach, in part because it would be undesirable for users to get search results like "'here's
the first 10 responses, but 9 of them were censored by your browser."' PICS Developers'
Workshop Summary, supra note 22; see also PICS Frequently Asked Questions (visited Feb. 9,
1997)<http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS>.
109. See, e.g., Gary Chapman, Universal Service Must First Serve Community, LA. TIMES,
June 3, 1996, at D1. See generally ROBERT H. ANDERSON ET AL., UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO E-MAIL:
FEASIBILITY AND SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS (1995)(discussing pros and cons of locating devices for e-
mail access in home, at work, in schools, and in libraries, post offices, community centers, and
kiosks).
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censorship."11 This policy, however, is not binding on member
libraries. It is likely that a substantial number of public libraries will
install blocking software on their public-access terminals, including
terminals intended for use by adults; indeed, some have already done
SO."' As one software vendor warns:
Unlimited Web Access is a Political Nightmare. Your library may
spend tens of thousands of dollars on Internet hardware/training and
then be closed down by an angry parent willing to go to the press
and the town council because their child saw pornographic materials
in the library.12
Still other people get Internet access through their employers.
Corporations too, wary of risk and wasted work time, may put
110. See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: Access to Electronic Information, Services, and
Networks: An Interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://aial.ala.org:
70/0/alagophx/alagophxfreedom/electacc.q%26a>; Access to Electronic Information, Services, and
Networks: An Interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights (visited Feb. 9, 1997)<http://alal.
ala.org:70/0/alagophx/alagophxfreedom/electacc.fin>.
111. See, e.g., Alan Boyle, Resolving the Information Battle (visited Mar. 17, 1997)
<http://www.msnbc.com.news/59459.asp>(explaining that Bakersfield, Cal. public libraries have
installed blocking software on all terminals); Pamela Mendels, Censoring Web Sites Poses
Dilemma for Librarians (Mar. 9, 1997)<http://nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/O30997libraries.
html>(Austin Tex. and Connetquot, N.Y.; same); Rebbeca Vesely, Library Blocks Porn, and
May Block Rights, WIRED NEWS (visited Jan. 7, 1997)<http://www.wired.com/news/story/
1289.html>(Orange County, Fla.; same). I do not want to overplay this point. Many libraries have
decided not to install blocking software. See, e.g., Ramon McLeod & Carolyne Zinko, Online
Smut in the Reading Room, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 1, 1997, at Al. Other libraries have installed the
software only on terminals intended for use by children. See, e.g., Geeta Anand, Library Ok's
Limits on 'Net Access, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 22, 1997, at Al. I am grateful to Linda Mielke,
President of the Public Library Association and Director of the Carroll County (Maryland)
Public Library, Kathleen Reif, Director of the Wicomoco County (Maryland) Free Library, and
Naomi Weinberg, President, Board of Trustees, Peninsula Public Library Lawrence, New York
for educating me on these issues.
112. Pornography and Gambling are Inappropriate in a Library (visited Feb. 9,
1997)<http://www.librarysafe.com/library.html>(typeface in original). The vendor is the Library
Safe Internet System.
Librarians have shown great courage in their decisions to carry controversial books and
artworks. They have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to carry items of sexually explicit
material that they consider valuable. Recent cases litigated by the Freedom to Read Foundation
include Lowe v. Kiesling, 882 P.2d 91 (Or. Ct. App. 1994),rev. dismissed, 889 P.2d 916 (Or. 1995),
challenging a proposed Oregon ballot measure that, among other things, would have forbidden
public libraries from collecting any materials on homosexuality writen for children, and Ong v.
Salt Lake City Public Library, in which plaintiffs sought to bar a public library from exhibiting art
including nudity. See Freedom to Read Foundation Annual Report For 1994-1995, 20 Freedom to
Read Foundation News, Nos. 3-4 (1995). (visited Apr. 17, 1997)<tttp://www.sirs.com/partner/
read/v20n3.htm>; Reports to Council, 19 Freedom to Read Foundation News, Nos. 3-4 (1994).
(visited Apr. 17, 1997)<http://www.sirs.com/partner/read/v19n2.htm>. By providing an
uncensored Internet feed, though, a library makes available material much more difficult to
defend in a political context.
stringent filters in place. Some large companies worry about the
possibility of being cited for sexual harassment by virtue of material
that came into the office via the Internet."' Even more are concerned
about sports and leisure information they feel may detract from
business productivity. One consultant sums up the corporate mood:
"My kids went out on the Web to a museum and saw great artwork,
but I don't want my employees hanging out at the Louvre all day on
my nickel."" 4
In sum, we may see home computers blocked -for reasons of
convenience, library computers blocked for reasons of politics, and
workplace computers blocked for reasons of profit. Even one
university temporarily installed blocking software in its computer labs,
in aid of a policy "prohibit[ing] the display in public labs of
pornographic material unrelated to educational programs." 1 5 The
result may be that large amounts of content may end up off-limits to a
substantial fraction of the adult population." 6
There are limits to this-sex sells. Many home Internet users will
be loathe to cut themselves off from the full range of available speech.
Most on-line services and Internet access providers, while attempting
to make parents feel secure about their children's exposure to sexually
explicit material on the Internet, will still host such material for adults
who wish to view it."7 It seems safe to conclude, though, that blocking
software will have the practical effect of restricting the access of a
substantial number of adults.
113. See Rosilind Retkwa, Corporate Censors, INTERNET WORLD, Sept. 1996, at 60; see also,
e.g., Microsystems Announces Immediate Availability of Cyber Patrol Proxy for Microsoft's Proxy
Server (July 31, 1996)<http://www.microsys.com/prfiles/proxy796.htm>.
114. Retkwa, supra note 113, at 61.
115. The university was the University of Arkansas at Monticello. See e-mail from Carl
Kadie to fight-censorship mailing list (Oct. 22, 1996); e-mail from Tyrone Adams to amendl-L
mailing list (Oct. 22, 1996); e-mail from Stephen Smith to Jonathan Weinberg (Oct. 22, 1996)(all
on file with author).
116. It is possible that Disney or a similar entity will get a large market share with a kid-
centered interface limiting users to a specific list of kid-friendly sites, and that that interface will
be so aggressively child-oriented that adults won't use it (and can't be suckered into using it).
Even so, employers and similar entities using the Internet will still have an interest in installing a
grown-up interface with blocking capabilities and, presumably, the market will respond to that.
117. Consider America Online. AOL markets itself as a family-friendly service. It allows
parents to confine their children to a "Kids Only" area, or to disallow their access to chat rooms
and Usenet news. AOL monitors the use of forbidden words in various contexts. It censors
messages posted in the advertisers' area called "Downtown AOL," removing advertisements that
its manager thinks do not have "the look and feel that best fits [AOL]'s environment." At the
same time, though, it allows its members to create chat rooms with names like "m needs bj now,"
"bond and gaged f4f," and "M4Fenema."
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This should affect the way we think about filtering software. Any
filtering system necessarily incorporates value judgments about the
speech being blocked. These value judgments are not so controversial
if we think of the typical user of blocking software as a parent
restricting his children's access. It is part of a parent's job, after all, to
make value judgments regarding his own child's upbringing. The value
judgments are much more controversial, though, if we think of the
typical "blockee" as an adult using a library computer, or using a
corporate computer after hours. If we are concerned about these
users' access to speech, then we need to think hard about the way
blocking software works, the extent to which it can be accurate, and




Across the world, governments and industry are turning to
filtering software as the answer to the problem of sexually explicit
material on the Internet. In the United Kingdom, service providers
and police have endorsed a proposal recommending that Internet
service providers require users to rate their own Web pages, and that
the providers remove Web pages that their creators have "persistently
and deliberately misrated."' 118 The European Commission has urged
the adoption of similar codes of conduct to ensure "systematic self-
rating of content" by all European content providers."9 Some U.S.
companies have been leaning the same way: Compuserve has decided
118. R3 Safety-Net: Rating Reporting Responsibility For Child Pornography and Illegal
Material on the Internet (last modified Sept. 23, 1996)<http://dtiinfol.dti.gov.uk/safety-
net/r3.htm>. Under the initial proposal, users were to rate with RSACi. See id. The proponents
apparently have backed away from that position. The proposal also recommends that Internet
service providers take steps to support rating and filtering of Usenet newsgroups. For an
explanation of the mechanics of the Usenet proposal, see Turnpike Newsgroups (last modified
Sept. 24, 1996)<http://www.tumpike.com /ratings>.
119. See Restricting Access to Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet: Communication to
the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions (Oct. 16, 1996)<http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/internet/content/communic.html>. A
recent EU working group document recommends research into new, non-RSAC rating systems,
so as to "take account of Europe's cultural and linquistic diversity" and "guarantee respect of
[users'] convictions." Report of Working Party on Illegal and Harmful Material on the Internet
(visited Mar. 7, 1997)<http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/intemet/ientent/wpen.html>. Other countries
have adopted more drastic approaches. See, e.g., Kathy Chen, China Bars Access To as Many as
100 Internet Web Sites, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1996, at B5; James Kynge, Singapore Cracks Down
on Internet, FIN. TIMES (London), July 12, 1996, at 6.
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to "encourage" its users and other content providers to self-rate using
RSACi.12
Ratings, though, come at a cost. It seems likely that a substantial
number of adults, in the near future, will view the Internet through
filters administered by blocking software. Intermediaries-employers,
libraries, and others-will gain greater control over the things these
adults read and see. Sites may be stripped out of the filtered universe
because of deliberate political choices on the part of rating service
administrators, and because of inaccuracies inherent in the ratings
process. If a rating service is to categorize a large number of sites, it
cannot simultaneously achieve consistency and nuance; the techniques
it must rely on to achieve consistency make it more difficult to capture
nuance, and make it less likely that users will find the ratings useful.
The necessity of excluding unrated sites may flatten speech on the Net,
disproportionately excluding speech that was not created by
commercial providers for a mass audience.
This is not to say that ratings are bad. The cost they impose, in
return for the comforting feeling that we can avert a threat to our
children, is surely much less than that imposed by the
Communications Decency Act. Ratings provide an impressive second-
best solution. We should not fool ourselves, though, into thinking that
they impose no cost at all.
120. See RSAC Press Release, Compuserve to Rate Internet Content by July 1 (May 9,
1996)<http://www.rsac.org/press/960509-1.html>.
